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The Gini coefficient is based on the sum of pairwise income differences, which can be decomposed into 
separate sums for individuals.  Differences vis-à-vis poorer people represent an individual’s advantage, 
while those with respect to richer people constitute deprivation.  Weighting deprivation and advantage 
differently produces a family of personal Gini coefficients whose population averages each equal the 
overall Gini coefficient.  Properties of the personal indexes explain why the Gini coefficient is most 
sensitive to changes in the middle of typical income distributions.  Behavior of the personal indexes also 
throws light on the inequality impacts of secular changes in income distribution.  In a simple Kuznets-
type process, the Gini coefficient first rises and then falls but, throughout, a personal Gini coefficient will 
be rising for people in the traditional sector, while it is falling for those in the modern sector.  In a leading 
case, the population shifts associated with polarization in labor markets in advanced economies also 
reduce personal inequality at the top and increase it at the bottom.  The shift of population toward the two 
extremes unambiguously raises personal inequality for those in the middle.  The wage changes 
accompanying polarization can, however, reverse these results, particularly at the top, as illustrated by 
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The Gini coefficient has a natural interpretation as the mean of personal inequality assessments.  While 
that fact is obvious once pointed out, it was not emphasized in the original work by Gini (1914) and has 
not been highlighted since.  This paper shows that this straightforward interpretation throws important 
light on the properties of the Gini coefficient.  It also allows us to better understand the reaction of the 
Gini coefficient, and possibly also that of individuals, to secular changes in income distribution.  The 
latter include the hypothetical transition from a traditional to a modern economy analyzed by Kuznets 
(1955), and the polarization in income distribution seen in recent decades in the US and some other 
countries.  Personal assessments of the direction of change in inequality may differ between people at 
different income levels.  These results suggest that our understanding of inequality measurement can be 
enriched by studying what it may mean at the personal level.   
The Gini coefficient can be defined or interpreted in many ways (Yitzhaki, 1998).  For our purposes the 
most useful is that it equals one half the mean difference divided by the mean.  That is, the Gini 
coefficient can be found by taking the sum of all pairwise absolute income differences, S, converting to an 
average and normalizing by the mean income.  S equals the sum across individuals i = 1, .., n of their 
personal sums of income differences with all other individuals, 𝑆𝑖.  The latter provide the basis for a 
personal inequality index whose average across the population is the Gini coefficient.   
For each individual, 𝑆𝑖 is composed of the sum of differences with respect to people at higher incomes 
plus the sum of differences vis- à -vis lower income persons.  Following Yitzhaki (1979) the sum of 
differences with higher incomes may be used to define the individual’s deprivation.  That concept is 
complemented by the individual’s advantage, derived from the sum of differences with respect to lower 
incomes.1  Summing either deprivation or advantage across the whole population produces the same total 
 
1 Yitzhaki (1979) used the term “relative deprivation”, which was introduced by Runciman (1966) to refer to any 




(Yitzhaki, 1979).  Therefore, any weighted average of deprivation and advantage, as well as an 
unweighted average, will generate the Gini coefficient. This means that there is a whole family of 
personal Gini coefficients.  One implication is that if societies choose to base overall inequality 
measurement on an average of individual assessments they may all use the Gini coefficient at the 
aggregate level even if they differ in the weight placed on advantage vs. deprivation at the personal level.   
The personal inequality indexes discussed here have both “top down” and “bottom up” interpretations.    
This paper does not take a position on which viewpoint is preferable.  It is not necessary to make a choice 
in order to pursue the analysis.  A personal Gini coefficient could be regarded as reflecting how a social 
planner would measure personal inequality.  This is a “top down” interpretation.  The “bottom up” view is 
that it would be reasonable for individuals themselves to assess inequality using such a measure. Why 
might they do so?   One possibility is that they could have interdependent utility functions of a form that 
suggests the use of a personal Gini coefficient (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).  Another may lie in bounded 
rationality.  Holding the mean constant, in a society of two people the difference between their incomes is 
a natural indicator of inequality.  People might, implicitly if not explicitly, extend this to regard the 
average of pairwise differences as an attractive indicator of inequality when there are more than two 
people.  That conclusion could be reinforced by information and computational constraints.  As shown in 
this paper, in order to compute the value of a personal Gini coefficient the individual only needs to know 
the fractions of the population with income above and below her and the average incomes of those two 
groups.  While we should not suppose that real-world individuals know everyone else’s income, they 
might be able to make a serviceable guess at these fractions and averages.  
If the “bottom up” interpretation of personal Gini coefficients is taken, our analysis is clearly related to 
the literature on individual attitudes toward inequality.  A portion of that literature attempts to measure 
 
“Deprivation” is used here simply because it is shorter.  Fehr and Schmidt (1999) referred to the same concept as 
“disadvantageous inequality”, but the term deprivation still dominates in the literature.  Yitzhaki (1979) used 




attitudes within narrow reference groups, e.g. co-workers or members of the same occupation.   In such 
cases people tend to be averse to deprivation but to like advantage.  As Clark and D’Ambrosio (2015) 
point out, in the income distribution literature the usual reference group is broader.  In that context, 
following Yitzhaki (1979, 1982) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) the general expectation has been that 
people will be averse to both deprivation and advantage.  There are some empirical or experimental 
studies that have estimated aversion to deprivation and/or advantage with broader reference groups.  
Using the German SOEP survey data, D’Ambrosio and Frick (2007) find strong aversion to deprivation 
(but do not report on attitudes to advantage).  Cojocaru (2014) finds significant aversion to both 
advantage and deprivation using a survey of 27 transition countries.  In experiments with subjects who 
played a sequential public goods game, Teyssier (2012) found that 40% were averse to both advantage 
and deprivation while 18% were averse to neither.  While these studies do not provide strong evidence on 
the relative degree of aversion to deprivation vs. advantage, neural studies find that brain activity reacts 
more strongly to deprivation (Clark and D’Ambrosio, 2015) and there appears to be close to a consensus 
that aversion is stronger to deprivation than to advantage for most people.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  For expositional simplicity we start by working with the 
“unbiased” case in which advantage and deprivation are equally weighted.  Section II defines the 
unbiased personal Gini coefficient and derives some of its basic properties.  In Section III we then explore 
how the behavior of this index helps to explain the sensitivity of the Gini coefficient to income changes in 
different ranges of a distribution. The analysis is extended to allow unequal weighting of deprivation and 
advantage in Section IV, which shows that the main insights of the previous two sections survive this 
generalization.  How the personal assessments of inequality vary with income is discussed in Section V 
and the behavior of those assessments during periods of secular change in income distribution is 





II. Unbiased Personal Gini Coefficient  
In this section we see how the Gini coefficient can be defined as the average value across individuals of 
an “unbiased” personal Gini coefficient, and begin to examine its properties.  The Gini coefficient for an 
income distribution equals one half the mean difference divided by the mean, as in:  
(1)        𝐺 =
1
2𝑛2?̅?









where 𝑦𝑖 is the income of individual i, ?̅? is mean income, n > 1, 𝑦1 ≤ 𝑦2 ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝑦𝑛, S is the sum of 
differences, and 𝑆/𝑛2 is the mean difference.2   
A natural but previously overlooked interpretation is that G is the mean value across individuals of an 
unbiased personal Gini coefficiet, 𝐺𝑖: 







where   
(3)       𝐺𝑖 =
1
2𝑛?̅?






and 𝑆𝑖 is the sum of differences for individual i.  Equation (3) can be rewritten: 







ℎ − 𝑦𝑖)] 
 
2 As mentioned earlier, the Gini coefficient can be expressed in many different ways (Yitzhaki, 1998). This is one of 
the two principal forms in which it was originally set out in Gini (1914), and is the most convenient for our 





𝑙 is the number of individuals with income less than or equal to 𝑦𝑖, excluding individual i, and 𝑛𝑖
ℎ 
is the number with income strictly greater than 𝑦𝑖, so that 𝑛𝑖
𝑙 + 𝑛𝑖
ℎ = 𝑛 − 1.3   ?̅?𝑖
𝑙 and ?̅?𝑖
ℎ are mean income 
among those with income less than or equal to 𝑦𝑖, excluding i, and strictly greater than 𝑦𝑖 respectively.   
Let 𝐻𝑖 be the set of all j such that 𝑦𝑗 >  𝑦𝑖 , and 𝐿𝑖 be the set of all j excluding i such that 𝑦𝑗  ≤  𝑦𝑖. 
Equation (4) can be expressed as: 
(4′)        𝐺𝑖 =  
1
2?̅?
(𝐴𝑖 + 𝐷𝑖) 
where: 
















ℎ − 𝑦𝑖) =
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑦𝑗 − 𝑦𝑖)
𝑗∈𝐻𝑖
 
𝐷𝑖 is the discrete analogue of the measure of relative deprivation for an individual, which we will refer to 
simply as deprivation, proposed by Yitzhaki (1979) for a continuous distribution.  It equals the average 
shortfall of i’s income below the income of those who are better off, weighted by the fraction of the 
population in the latter group.  Equation (4΄) shows that 𝐺𝑖is the simple average of 𝐷𝑖 and a 
complementary measure, 𝐴𝑖, normalized by the mean.  We will say that 𝐴𝑖 represents individual i’s 
advantage compared to people with lower income.  Thus, from the individual perspective inequality 
consists of both deprivation with respect to the better off and advantage over the worse off.   
While 𝐺𝑖 is a natural personal inequality index to associate with the Gini coefficient, it is not the only 
such index.  As mentioned earlier, and as shown in Section IV, one can define a more general class of 
 
3 The choice to include individuals who have the same income as i in the lower group rather than in the higher group 




personal Gini coefficients that are based on a weighted average of 𝐴𝑖 and 𝐷𝑖.  𝐺𝑖 is a special case in which 
the weights on 𝐴𝑖 and 𝐷𝑖 are equal.     
From (4) we have: 
Proposition 1:  𝐺𝑖 is insensitive to a transfer of income within 𝐻𝑖 or within 𝐿𝑖 if the composition of 
neither group changes as a result of the transfer.   
The proposition follows from the fact that transfers of income confined either to 𝐻𝑖 or 𝐿𝑖 do not alter 
𝑛𝑖
𝑙 ,  ?̅?𝑖
𝑙  , 𝑛𝑖
ℎ, or ?̅?𝑖
ℎ or any other term on the right-hand side of (4).  In terms of (4΄), as noted by Yitzhaki 
(1979) these transfers have no effect on advantage, 𝐴𝑖, or on deprivation, 𝐷𝑖.  The insensitivity of 𝐺𝑖 to 
such transfers means that it does not respect the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, which is a 
cornerstone of the theory of aggregate inequality measurement.4  That an aggregate index that respects the 
Pigou-Dalton principle can be built on the basis of personal indexes that violate the principle is striking.   
Sensitivity of 𝑮𝒊 to a transfer of income between 𝑯𝒊 and 𝑳𝒊 
What determines how sensitive 𝐺𝑖 is to a transfer of income between 𝐻𝑖 and 𝐿𝑖?  Consider the transfer of 
a total amount R from 𝐻𝑖 to 𝐿𝑖. Note that such a transfer reduces both 𝐴𝑖and 𝐷𝑖 by R/n, as can be seen 
from (5) where 𝑛𝑖
𝑙(𝑦𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖
𝑙) and  𝑛𝑖
ℎ(?̅?𝑖
ℎ − 𝑦𝑖) both fall by R.  We will allow R to be negative, so this also 
handles the case of transfers from 𝐿𝑖  to 𝐻𝑖, which increase 𝐴𝑖  and 𝐷𝑖 by equal amounts.  Using  










from (4΄) we have: 
 
4 Dalton (1920, p. 351) identified the central importance of the “principle of transfers”, which says that a rank-
preserving transfer from a richer person to a poorer person reduces inequality.  Dalton referred his readers to an 
earlier statement of the same idea by Pigou.  More recently the principle has come to be referred to as the “Pigou-











which allows us to state: 
Proposition 2: When income is transferred from a person with income strictly above 𝑦𝑖 to someone with 
income strictly below 𝑦𝑖, 𝐺𝑖 falls, while if income is transferred from a person with income strictly below 
𝑦𝑖 to someone with income strictly above 𝑦𝑖, 𝐺𝑖 rises.  In both cases the change in 𝐺𝑖 is proportional to the 
amount transferred and independent of 𝑦𝑖. 
Sensitivity of 𝑮𝒊 to a transfer affecting 𝒚𝒊   
We also need to analyze those cases where distributional changes affect individual i’s own income. There 
are two situations to consider.  One is that of a transfer from i to another person j.  The other is that of a 
transfer from j to i.  We will consider them in turn.  In this analysis, and in the remainder of the paper 
unless indicated otherwise, we will assume 𝑦1 < 𝑦2 < ⋯ < 𝑦𝑛.  This assumption will simplify the 
analysis since, for example, it implies that when n is odd there is a unique individual with median income, 
𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑑, and half the remaining population has 𝑦𝑖 < 𝑦
𝑚𝑒𝑑 while the other half have 𝑦𝑖 > 𝑦
𝑚𝑒𝑑 . 5  If n is even 
there is no individual with 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦
𝑚𝑒𝑑 , but 𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑑, which is defined as the midpoint between 𝑦𝑛/2 and 
𝑦𝑛/2+1, again divides the population into two sub-populations of equal size with incomes above and 
below the median.  
Transfer from i to j:  Let 𝑦𝑖
𝑜 and 𝑦𝑗
𝑜 be initial incomes and consider the effect on 𝐺𝑖 of the transfer of a 
small amount r from individual i to individual j.  From (4) we obtain: 
Proposition 3a:  The effect on 𝐺𝑖 of a small transfer in the amount of r from individual i to an individual 
j is given by: 
 
5 If we assume only 𝑦1 ≤ 𝑦2 ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝑦𝑛 then there could be multiple individuals with median income and the groups 
with income strictly below the median and strictly above the median need not contain an equal number of members.  









𝑙) − 1]r ,        𝑖 > 𝑗 





𝑙) + 1]r ,        𝑖 < 𝑗 
If we would ignore the -1 and +1 in the square brackets on the right-hand side, (7) would say that 
irrespective of whether i was greater or less than j, a transfer from i to anyone else would increase 𝐺𝑖 if i 
was below the median and reduce 𝐺𝑖 if i was above the median.  This reflects the fact that the main 
impact of the transfer on 𝐺𝑖 is to reduce 𝐴𝑖 and increase 𝐷𝑖.  If 𝑛𝑖
ℎ > 𝑛𝑖
𝑙, individual i is below the median 
and from (5) we see that the increase in 𝐷𝑖 will exceed the drop in 𝐴𝑖, since those changes are 
proportional to 𝑛𝑖
ℎ and 𝑛𝑖
𝑙 respectively.  If 𝑛𝑖
ℎ < 𝑛𝑖
𝑙, individual i is above the median and we have the 
opposite case.  These conclusions are modified only trivially by the -1 and +1 in the square brackets in 
(7).6  
Transfer from j to i:  Here incomes after a transfer are 𝑦𝑖
𝑜 + 𝑟 and 𝑦𝑗
𝑜 − 𝑟. and we have: 
Proposition 3b:  The effect on 𝐺𝑖 of a small transfer in the amount of r from an individual j to individual 
i is given by: 





ℎ) + 1]r ,        𝑖 > 𝑗 





ℎ) − 1]r ,        𝑖 < 𝑗 
 
6 The -1 in (7i) means that the rank at which ∆𝐺𝑖 switches from being positive to negative as we go up the income 
scale in the 𝑖 > 𝑗 case is shifted one position higher because the transfer goes to a person with income lower than the 
“donor” i, reducing ?̅?𝑖
𝑙 and 𝐴𝑖 a little.  And the +1 in (7ii) means that when 𝑖 < 𝑗, ∆𝐺𝑖 switches from positive to 
negative is shifted one position lower than would otherwise be the case since the transfer goes to a higher income 
person, raising ?̅?𝑖





Now the main effect of the transfer is to raise 𝑦𝑖 and therefore to increase 𝐴𝑖 and reduce 𝐷𝑖, which is 
equalizing if 𝑦𝑖 is below the median and disequalizing if 𝑦𝑖 is above the median.  Again the point at which 
∆𝐺𝑖 switches sign as i rises is offset one position by the small impact of the change in 𝑦𝑗 on 𝐴𝑖 when 𝑖 > 𝑗 
and on 𝐷𝑖 when 𝑖 < 𝑗.   
Summing up, we can say that for an individual whose income is above the median, a small transfer from 
herself to someone else is equalizing, from a personal standpoint, if her income is above the median, and 
is disequalizing if her income is below the median (subject to the small qualification indicated in footnote 
6).  If she is the recipient, a small transfer is equalizing from the personal viewpoint if she is below the 
median and disequalizing if she is above the median (again subject to footnote 6).  Thus, the situation in 
this form of personal inequality measurement is quite different from that in aggregate inequality 
measurement.  In the latter, the impact of a small transfer on inequality is deemed equalizing if the 
donor’s income exceeds the recipient’s and disequalizing if the opposite holds.  In the case of personal 
Gini coefficients, in contrast, whether the transfer is considered equalizing or disequalizing depends 
almost solely on the income of the person for whom the assessment is being made.  For low income 
people, if they make a transfer it is disequalizing while if they receive a transfer it is equalizing.  For high 
income people the opposite holds. 
III.  Explaining the sensitivity of the Gini coefficient to changes in different ranges of the income 
distribution 
From (1) one may derive: 
(9)        𝐺 =
2
𝑛2?̅?




(see e.g. Cowell, 2011, p. 114).  This provides insight into the sensitivity of the Gini coefficient to 
changes in different ranges of the income distribution.  Consider a small transfer, r, from individual j to 




discussions of aggregate inequality.  From (9), this transfer will produce a change in the Gini coefficient 
given by: 




which also tells us the impact of a transfer from i to j, in which case 𝑟 < 0.  We see that the impact on the 
Gini coefficient does not depend on 𝑦𝑖 or 𝑦𝑗, but varies only with r and the difference in income ranks 
between i and j.     
The fact that the sensitivity of the Gini coefficient to transfers is independent of the incomes of the 
transferor and transferee, but depends on the number of people between them in the distribution, is one of 
the most interesting properties of the Gini coefficient. This property follows directly from those of the 
personal inequality index 𝐺𝑖 captured in Propositions 1, 2 and 3 above.  Again considering a small 
transfer, r, from individual j to individual i where i < j , Proposition 1 implies: 
(11𝑖)       ∆𝐺𝑘 = 0.      𝑘 < 𝑖, 𝑘 > 𝑗. 
From Proposition 2 we have: 
(11𝑖𝑖)       ∆𝐺𝑘 =
−𝑟
𝑛?̅?
.      𝑖 < 𝑘 < 𝑗. 
And from Proposition 3 










  . 
Now, from (2) and (11i), the change in G resulting from a transfer from j to i is given by: 
(13)            ∆𝐺 =
1
𝑛
(∆𝐺𝑖 + ∆𝐺𝑗 + ∑ ∆𝐺𝑘
𝑗−1
𝑘=𝑖+1 ) 










which is proportional to the number of people between i and j, that is the number of people the transfer 
from j to i “passes over”.   
Next, to complete the analysis of  ∆𝐺, note from (12) that:  























ℎ both equal j – i we have: 
(15)      ∆𝐺𝑖 + ∆𝐺𝑗 =
−𝑟
𝑛?̅?
(𝑗 − 𝑖 + 1)      
Hence, like ∑ ∆𝐺𝑘
𝑗−1
𝑘=𝑖+1  , ∆𝐺𝑖 + ∆𝐺𝑗 is proportional to the size of the transfer and rises linearly, in 
absolute value, with the number of people between i and j.7   In this case the reason for dependence on the 
number of people between i and j is that the effects of the transfer cancel out for 𝐴𝑖  and 𝐴𝑗 on the one 
hand, and for 𝐷𝑖 and 𝐷𝑗 on the other, where the sums they are based on overlap.  The range of overlap 
includes all 𝑘 < 𝑖 for 𝐴𝑖  and 𝐴𝑗, and all 𝑘 > 𝑗 for 𝐷𝑖 and 𝐷𝑗.  The range where effects do not cancel out 
has 𝑗 − 𝑖 + 1 people in it.   
Summing up, substituting (14) and (15) into (13) we have: 
(16)        ∆𝐺 =
−𝑟
𝑛2?̅?





7 Note that the right-hand-side of (15) is not proportional to the number of people between i and j, which is 𝑗 − 𝑖 −




which is the same as (10).  So, we have shown that the mean of the effects on the personal inequality 
indexes resulting from the transfer equals the change in G that one would expect from aggregate 
inequality analysis.   
The purpose of this exercise has been to show that the effects of a transfer on personal inequality explain 
the impact on G.  That the reaction of G is governed by the number of people between transferor j and 
transferee i is due to two things: (i) aside from i and j themselves, the only people whose personal 
inequality is affected by the transfer are the individuals between them in the distribution, and (ii) the 
effects of the transfer on 𝐺𝑖 and 𝐺𝑗 cancel out except for those based on changes in income gaps between i 
or j and individuals in the range (i+1, j-1).    
IV. Unequal Weighting of Deprivation and Advantage 
Yitzhaki (1979) defined relative deprivation for a society as a whole, D, as the average of individual 
deprivation indexes 𝐷𝑖.  He worked with continuous distributions.  The corresponding relationship with a 
discrete income distribution is: 







We can define overall advantage in a parallel way as: 







Yitzhaki shows that D is related to the Gini coefficient according to: 







This result might appear puzzling, given that, from (4΄), 𝐷𝑖 represents only part of an individual’s 
contribution to 𝐺𝑖 and therefore to G.  The explanation is as follows.  The Gini coefficient is proportional 
to the sum of differences, S.   We can arrange the pairwise differences |𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑗| making up S in a matrix 
M with i indexing rows and j indexing columns.  D is the mean of the elements of M above the main 
diagonal while A is the mean of the below-diagonal elements.  Now, the above-diagonal elements have 
the same mean as the below-diagonal elements in M, since e.g. |𝑦2 − 𝑦1|  =  |𝑦1 − 𝑦2|.  Hence A = D.  To 
get from D to S we must therefore double D and multiply by 𝑛2 (to go from an average to a sum).  The 
same procedure could be used to generate S from A.  Thus we have 𝑆 = 2𝑛2𝐷 = 2𝑛2𝐴 or: 




Substituting the expression for D from (20) into (19) we obtain 𝐺 = 𝑆/(2𝑛2?̅?) , that is equation (1).     
While Yitzhaki’s approach and ours are closely related, his 𝐷𝑖 and our 𝐺𝑖 are distinct.  𝐺𝑖 depends not just 
on deprivation, 𝐷𝑖, but also on advantage, 𝐴𝑖.  While, overall, A = D, at the individual level there is no 
such relationship.  𝐴𝑖  rises and 𝐷𝑖 falls as we move up through the income distribution from 𝑦1 to 𝑦𝑛, and 
they do so at rates that rise or fall depending on the shape of the particular income distribution being 
examined.   
The fact that 𝐴 = 𝐷 has important consequences for personal Gini coefficients.  Using (19) and 𝐴 = 𝐷,  
G may be found by taking a weighted average of A and D, as in:  
(21)           𝐺 =
𝜆𝐴 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐷
?̅?
                            0 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 1 
where we require the weights to be positive.  This in turn reveals that there is a family of personal Gini 
coefficients of the form: 








Hence, while λ may differ across societies, they can nevertheless agree on using G as an aggregate 
measure of inequality.  In the continuous case this result could be generalized to allow λ to differ across 
individuals, as long as the distribution of λ was independent of individual income. 
We may ask which of the results derived above for the λ = ½ case survive once 𝜆 ≠ ½ is allowed.  
Proposition 1, which says that the 𝐺𝑖 are insensitive to transfers entirely within the 𝐻𝑖 or 𝐿𝑖 comparator 
groups, survives.  The principle is not affected by re-weighting income differences with the 𝐻𝑖 and 𝐿𝑖       
groups via λ≠ ½ .  Proposition 2, which says that when income is transferred from those with income 
above (below) 𝑦𝑖 to those with income below (above) 𝑦𝑖 the fall (rise) in 𝐺𝑖 is proportional to the total 
amount transferred, R, and is independent of 𝑦𝑖  is also unaltered because we still have: 










and (6) survives unchanged because in the more general formulation, using (22) we have: 

















Proposition 3 described the impact on 𝐺𝑖  of making a small transfer from another person to individual i.  
Assuming 𝑦1 < 𝑦2 < ⋯ < 𝑦𝑛, the conclusion in the λ = ½ case was that, except for a very small region 
around the median, a transfer from a higher income person would reduce 𝐺𝑖 if 𝑦𝑖was below the median, 
and increase 𝐺𝑖  if 𝑦𝑖 was above the median.  Converse results held if the transfer came from a lower 
income person.  The critical role of the median arose because with λ = ½, advantage, 𝐴𝑖, and deprivation, 
𝐷𝑖, are equally weighted.  In general, the critical percentile is given by 1-λ.  Thus, for example, if one 
placed half as much weight on 𝐴𝑖 as on 𝐷𝑖, i.e. λ = 1/3, the critical percentile would be 2/3.  That means 
that a small transfer from someone with higher income would be regarded as equalizing for or by almost 




third.  This occurs because putting a higher weight on 𝐷𝑖 increases the equalizing impact on 𝐺𝑖
𝜆 from the 
fall in 𝐷𝑖 caused by such a transfer.    
V.  Personal Inequality Assessments at Different Income Levels 
This section examines how 𝐺𝑖
𝜆 varies as 𝑦𝑖 rises from 𝑦1 to 𝑦𝑛.  Results are provided for the general case 
where λ can take on any value in the interval [0,1], but specific conclusions for the case where λ = ½ 
are also noted.   
How does 𝐺𝑖
𝜆 change as we move up through the distribution of income?  We continue to assume 𝑦1 <
𝑦2 < ⋯ < 𝑦𝑛.  As we go from individual i to i+1, the absolute income gaps in (3) or implicitly in (22) 
increase in value by 𝑦𝑖+1 − 𝑦𝑖 for all j such that 𝑦𝑗 < 𝑦𝑖 , and the corresponding gaps for all j > i fall by 
the same amount.  Hence we should expect that 𝐺𝑖
𝜆 will initially decline as i rises from 1, since at the start 
there are more people with j > i than with j ≤ i , until some critical point is reached, beyond which 𝐺𝑖 
should begin to increase.  Formally we have: 
Proposition 4:    If  𝑦1 < 𝑦2 < ⋯ < 𝑦𝑛 ,           
           𝐺𝑖+1
𝜆
>
  = 
<
  𝐺𝑖







  1 − 𝜆 . 
Proof:  See Appendix. 
 
Proposition 4 indicates that 𝐺𝑖
𝜆 falls up to the (1 − 𝜆)100th percentile of the distribution and increases 
above that.  As indicated above, this U-shaped pattern is based on the fact that moving from income 𝑦𝑖  to 
income 𝑦𝑖+1increases the income gaps with lower income people and reduces those with higher income 
people by the same absolute amount.  The relative impact of changes in the upper gaps compared with 
that of changes in the lower gaps is (1-λ)/λ. This means that 𝐺𝑖




λ < ½, compared with the λ = ½ case, and less rapidly if λ > ½.  Note that if 𝜆 =
1
2
 ,  𝐺𝑖
𝜆 = 𝐺𝑖 falls up to 
the 50th percentile, that is up to the median, and rises thereafter.  
We can also readily identify the value of 𝐺𝑖
𝜆 at the bottom and top of the distribution (i = 1 and i = n), as 
well as the value of 𝐺𝑖
𝜆 for the median individual, 𝐺𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝜆 , if n is odd.  We have: 
Proposition 5:  If 𝑦1 < 𝑦2 < ⋯ < 𝑦𝑛, 
(i)  𝐺1










𝑙 ]; if n is even, 𝐺𝑚𝑒𝑑






Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Proposition 5 allows us to put upper bounds on 𝐺1
𝜆 and 𝐺𝑛
𝜆.  If 𝑦1 is non-negative, the highest possible 
value of 𝐺1
𝜆 is 1 − 𝜆, which occurs when 𝑦1 = 0.  When deprivation and advantage are weighted equally, 
that is when 𝜆 =
1
2
, the maximum value is 
1
2
.  But the maximum value of 𝐺1
𝜆 ranges from 0, when λ = 1 
and personal inequality depends only on advantage, to 1 when λ = 0 and it depends only on deprivation. 
In view of Proposition 4, these maxima also apply to all 𝐺𝑖
𝜆 up to the (1 − 𝜆)100th percentile.8  The 
upper bound on 𝐺𝑛
𝜆 occurs when one individual has all the income and 𝑦𝑛 = 𝑛?̅? .  In that case 𝐺𝑛
𝜆 =
𝜆(𝑛 − 1) , which is also an upper bound for all 𝐺𝑖
𝜆’s above the (1 − 𝜆)100th percentile.    
 
Part (ii) of the proposition is also interesting, in throwing light on the value of the personal inequality 
index for the “average person”, that is on the value of 𝐺𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝜆 .  The latter is based on a weighted average of 
?̅?𝑚𝑒𝑑
ℎ  𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̅?𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝑙 , with the weight on ?̅?𝑚𝑒𝑑
ℎ  falling with λ.  In the focal case with 𝜆 = 1/2 , we have: 
 
8 Note that with λ = 1, the (1 – λ)100th percentile = 0, so that 𝐺𝑖

























, which yields 𝐺𝑚𝑒𝑑 ≈ 0.3, 
less than the value of the Gini coefficient, which was 0.476 in 2013.9  We may also note values of 𝐺𝑚𝑒𝑑 
under some familiar continuous distributions.  𝐺𝑚𝑒𝑑 would equal  
1
4
 for a uniform distribution, and if 𝑦𝑖 ~ 





 , that is two-fifths of the coefficient of variation. 
 
We can see that 𝐺𝑖
𝜆 will generally not be symmetric around the median.  Looking at the 𝜆 = 1/2 case 
again, for example,  𝐺𝑖 will never be greater than 1/2 at the lowest income level, but can be very high at 
the top end.  𝐺𝑖 is not bounded above by 1, unlike the Gini coefficient.  𝐺𝑛 = 1 is reached when 
𝑦𝑛
?̅?
= 3 .  
That ratio is exceeded in almost all real-world cases.  This implies that, in a mathematical sense, from the 
standpoint of the rich there is more inequality than from that of the poor when 𝜆 = 1/2, which is 
intuitive. For the rich there are relatively few people whose incomes is close to theirs, meaning there is a 
large gulf between their income and most others’.   
 
VI.  Personal Inequality During Secular Change in Income Distribution 
This section asks how 𝐺𝑖
𝜆 can be predicted to behave at different income levels during periods of secular 
change in income distribution.  We focus initially in each case on the  𝜆 = 1/2 case, in which deprivation 
and advantage are weighted equally, referring to 𝐺𝑖
1/2
 simply as 𝐺𝑖, as above. We start with the Kuznets 
 
9 With the help of quintile share and other data from U.S. Census Bureau (2021) it can be estimated that ?̅?𝑚𝑒𝑑
ℎ =
1.64𝑦 ̅ and ?̅?𝑚𝑒𝑑




transformation and go on to the polarization and rising inequality that has been seen in the U.S. and many 
other high income countries in the last few decades.  The principles at work are explored with the help of 
illustrative examples.    
Kuznets Transformation 
Kuznets (1955) analyzed what may happen to income distribution and inequality in a growing economy 
where production is shifting from an initially large traditional agricultural sector to a modern sector.  The 
modern sector eventually comprises most if not all of the economy.   The consequences for inequality can 
be illustrated using a stylized model in which individual incomes are uniform within each of the sectors, 
higher in the modern sector, and unchanging during the growth process.10  (The assumption that 
individual incomes do not change within the sectors is relaxed below.) In this case the Gini coefficient, G, 
rises until the fraction of the population in the modern sector, p, hits a critical value, after which it 
declines.   This critical value of p is less than one half.  That is because, while the mean difference has a 
maximum at 𝑝 = 1/2, the mean, which appears in the denominator of the expression for G, is rising 
throughout, so G has already started to decline at 𝑝 = 1/2. 
The suggestion that countries should generally be expected to display an inverted U-shaped time profile 
of the Gini coefficient, that is the “Kuznets hypothesis”, has been shown not to describe what has actually 
happened in many countries (Deininger and Squire, 1998; Frazer, 2006; Angeles, 2010).  However, it is 
of theoretical interest and is relevant to the historical experience of some countries.  A current example is 
China, where a vigorous movement of people from the countryside to urban areas with much higher 
average income has been going on since the onset of market reforms in the late 1970s.  At the beginning 
of that transition the Gini coefficient fluctuated around 0.30 (Sicular, 2013).  It rose to a peak of 0.437 in 
 
10 Kuznets considered a richer range of possibilities.  He allowed unequal income distribution within both sectors 
and believed the leading case was one in which there was greater inequality in the modern sector than in the 
traditional, or agricultural, sector.  He also considered the impacts of changes in the relative income, and of income 
inequality, in the modern vs. the agricultural sector over time.  In most cases he found that as the relative population 




2010 and then began to fall, reaching 0.385 by 2016 (World Bank, 2021).  These trends could plausibly 
be due to a Kuznets process (Knight, 2014). 11 
The behavior of the Gini coefficient and unbiased personal Gini coefficients in rural and urban areas 
during the Kuznets transformation will be illustrated here using an example whose implications are shown 
in Figure 1.  It is assumed that income of each person in the traditional sector is 12% of per capita income 
in the modern sector.  This gap is sufficient for the peak value of G to be 0.5.  
Taking the λ = ½ case to begin with, we will refer to the individual inequality measures of people in the 
low and high income groups as 𝐺𝐿 and 𝐺𝐻 respectively.  Since no one is worse off than those in the low 
income group, 𝐺𝐿 =
𝐷𝐿
?̅?
 , that is it is based entirely on deprivation, while 𝐺𝐻 =
𝐴𝐻
?̅?
  and is based wholly on 
advantage.  Denoting income per person in the traditional sector 𝑦𝐿 and in the modern sector 𝑦𝐻, and 
adopting corresponding notation for the number of persons in each sector, 𝑛𝐿 and 𝑛𝐻, we have: 
(23i)     𝐷𝐿 =
𝑛𝐻
𝑛
(𝑦𝐻 − 𝑦𝐿) 
(23ii)     𝐴𝐻 =
𝑛𝐿
𝑛
(𝑦𝐻 − 𝑦𝐿) 
As shown in Figure 1, when the modern sector is tiny, 𝐺𝐿 is close to zero.  Almost everyone in the society 
has the same low income, so that 𝑛𝐻 and 𝐷𝐿 are very low. The situation in the modern sector is the 
opposite.  Since almost everyone has much lower income than those in the modern sector, the individual 
inequality measure there, 𝐺𝐻 is very high.  Now, as development proceeds, 𝐺𝐿 rises monotonically and 
𝐺𝐻 falls monotonically - - a necessary result in this simple model.
12   It is interesting to think what this  
 
11Knight (2014) discussed whether China could be beyond the peak of the Kuznets curve.  His conclusion was that 
that would depend in part on public policy but that there were strong underlying forces pushing in the direction of 
falling inequality in China.  
12 𝐷𝐿  rises with the increase in 𝑛𝐻 and 𝐴𝐻 falls as 𝑛𝐿 declines.  But one must also account for ?̅? rising throughout the 
Kuznets process when analyzing 𝐺𝐿 and 𝐺𝐻.  This rise reinforces the decline of 𝐴𝐻 to ensure that 𝐺𝐻 must fall 
throughout.  And while the rise in ?̅? , by itself, would make 𝐷𝐿  fall, the increase in 𝑛𝐻 has a stronger effect, so that 





would mean if the personal inequality assessments reflected individual attitudes.  People in the traditional 
sector would believe that inequality was becoming steadily worse while those in the modern sector would 
think the opposite, hardly a recipe for social harmony.  
How does one resolve the conflict when the trend in inequality looks as radically different from the 
standpoint of two population groups as in the Kuznets transformation?  The Gini coefficient offers a 
solution - - take an average of the personal assessments.  Thus, in the Kuznets curve example, G is a 
population weighted average of the values of 𝐺𝐿 and 𝐺𝐻.  An alternative would be, in effect, to take a vote 
on the question of whether inequality was rising or falling - - a “democratic” approach.  Here the 











































































































Proportion of Population in Modern Sector
Figure 1: Kuznets Transformation: Personal Gini Coefficients with λ = 1/2 in 
Traditional and Modern Sectors with λ = 1/2 , and the overall Gini Coefficient 





½ and falls thereafter.  In the example, G says that inequality rises until p = ¼ and falls after that.  That is 
because 𝐺𝐻 falls faster than 𝐺𝐿 rises, so that averaging 𝐺𝐻 and 𝐺𝐿, even using population weights, places 
greater relative importance on the decline in 𝐺𝐻 than on the rise in 𝐺𝐿.   
The above analysis would not be affected significantly by moving from the λ = ½ case to the biased case 
with λ ≠ ½.  There would of course be no impact on the time path of G.  Since personal inequality in each 
sector only depends either on deprivation (in the traditional sector) or advantage (in the modern sector), at 
the individual level there would simply be a rescaling of 𝐺𝐿
𝜆 and 𝐺𝐻
𝜆 at each point in the Kuznets process.  
For a majority of people personal inequality would still be rising until p = ½ is reached, and above that 
point the opposite would still be true.  G would have its peak at the same point as with λ = ½ .  In terms of 
Figure 1, there would be a proportionate shift of the 𝐺𝐿 curve by the factor 2(1 − 𝜆) and a shift of the 𝐺𝐻 
curve in the opposite direction by the factor 2𝜆.  In the case where λ < ½, the 𝐺𝐿 and 𝐺𝐻 curves (now 𝐺𝐿
𝜆 
and 𝐺𝐻
𝜆)  would move towards each other, while if λ > ½ the result would be the opposite.  
What difference does it make if incomes are not constant within the two sectors during the Kuznets 






 in the 
calculations of 𝐺𝐻
𝜆 and 𝐺𝐿
𝜆, respectively.   The answer depends on the percentage size of the possibly 
opposing changes.  In the case of China, at least, the income changes appear to have been dominated by 
population shift.  Identifying urban areas as our H sector and rural areas as L, from 1980 to 2014 (𝑦𝐻 −
𝑦𝐿)/?̅?  fell by 18% in China while 
𝑛𝐿
𝑛
 dropped 44% and 
𝑛𝐻
𝑛
 went up 183%.13   
  
 
13 The % changes reported here were calculated using tables 2-1 and 6-6 of National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(2016), which indicate an urbanization rate of 19.4% in 1980 and 54.8% in 2014.  Disposable household income per 
capita in urban areas was 478 yuan in 1980 and 29,381 yuan in 2014; the corresponding rural numbers were 191 and 





There is much theoretical and empirical literature on polarization (including Foster and Wolfson, 1992; 
Esteban and Ray, 1994; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Green and Sand, 2015).   
Polarization in labor markets has received particular attention in the US and other high income countries 
in recent years.  In this case the relative demand for labor shifts away from mid-level occupations to both 
low-skilled and (especially) high skilled occupations.  Other things constant this should result in a shift in 
labor force composition away from the middle toward both the top and bottom.  Such a shift has indeed 
occurred over significant timespans in the US, Canada, the UK, Germany and some other European 
countries (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Green and Sand, 2015).  In most cases the wages of highly skilled 
workers have increased while those of workers in mid-level occupations have tended to decline.  In the 
US it has also been found that wages have risen in certain low skilled occupations (Autor and Dorn, 2013) 
although that trend has not been seen in some other leading OECD countries (Green and Sand, 2015). 
We will analyze the effects of labor market polarization on personal inequality in two steps, first  
considering only the effects of population shift, that is a rise in the number of individuals at low and high 
incomes combined with a reduction in the number at middle income.  Subsequently we will look at the 
effect of changes in income.  Assume that there are just three income levels in a society and that they 
display 𝑦𝐿 < 𝑦𝑀 < 𝑦𝐻.  Numbers of individuals in the three groups are 𝑛𝐿 , 𝑛𝑀, and 𝑛𝐻.  As in the 









.    
Once again, qualitative results for  𝐺𝐿
𝜆 and 𝐺𝐻
𝜆 will be the same as for 𝐺𝐿 and 𝐺𝐻, so we will focus on the 
latter for simplicity. The increase in 𝑛𝐻 due to polarization will tend to make 𝐴𝐻 and 𝐺𝐻  decrease since 
(from 5i): 








However, there is now an offsetting effect because ?̅?𝐻
𝑙  falls due to the population shift from the middle to 
lower groups, and therefore (𝑦𝐻 − ?̅?𝐻
𝑙 ) increases.  It can readily be shown that: 


















< 1 and 
∆𝑛𝐿
−∆𝑁𝑀
< 1 as well, so it is not immediately clear which way the inequality will go.  
However, we can make a prediction in a “leading case”.  With a positively skewed distribution of income 






 , so that if half or fewer of those leaving the middle income group go to the 







and 𝐴𝐻 and 𝐺𝐻 will decline, as in the Kuznets case.   
Turning to the bottom group, from (5ii) we have: 




ℎ − 𝑦𝐿) 
And it can be shown that: 


















> 1 and 
−∆𝑛𝑀
∆𝑛𝐻
> 1 as well, so again there is ambiguity.  However, in the leading case 
identified above  
𝑦𝐻−𝑦𝐿
𝑦𝑀−𝑦𝐿
> 2 and 
−∆𝑛𝑀
∆𝑛𝐻
< 2, so 𝐷𝐿  and 𝐺𝐿 will rise, as in the Kuznets analysis.  This would 
be the result of the increase in ?̅?𝐿
ℎ having a larger effect on 𝐷𝐿 and 𝐺𝐿 than the decline in 𝑛𝐿
ℎ = (𝑛𝑀 +




Population shift has unambiguous results for the middle group because, unlike the case of the top and 
bottom groups, the income differences vis-à-vis higher or lower groups are not affected by changes in 
𝑛𝐿 , 𝑛𝑀, and 𝑛𝐻.   𝐺𝑀
𝜆  depends on both 𝐴𝑀 and 𝐷𝑀,  





while personal advantage and deprivation are proportional to 𝑛𝐿  and 𝑛𝐻 respectively: 
(29i)     𝐴𝑀 =
𝑛𝐿
𝑛
(𝑦𝑀 − 𝑦𝐿) 
(29ii)     𝐷𝑀 =
𝑛𝐻
𝑛
(𝑦𝐻 − 𝑦𝑀) 
Since both 𝑛𝐿 and 𝑛𝐻 rise in polarization, the pure effect of population shift is for 𝐺𝑀
𝜆  to increase for any 
value of λ.  
Turning to income changes, as mentioned above, it is typically observed in labor market polarization that 
𝑦𝐻 rises and 𝑦𝑀 declines.  In the US it has also been found that 𝑦𝐿 rises.  The rise of 𝑦𝐻 opposes the 
“leading case” effects of population shift found above for the H group, so that personal inequality may 
rise at the top once income changes are taken into account.  Impacts for both middle and lower groups are 
theoretically ambiguous.  With (𝑦𝐻 − 𝑦𝑀) rising, 𝐷𝑀 also rises, tending to make 𝐺𝑀
𝜆  increase.  But 𝐴𝑀 
may fall if (𝑦𝑀 − 𝑦𝐿) declines sufficiently.  (The example considered below shows this can occur in 
practice.)   If 𝐴𝑀 falls then 𝐺𝑀
𝜆  will also fall if the weight placed on 𝐴𝑀 in (28) is sufficiently large.  
Finally, the impact of income changes on 𝐺𝐿
𝜆 is ambiguous since (?̅?𝐿
ℎ − 𝑦𝐿) in (26) may fall if 𝑦𝐿 rises 
sufficiently and also because the fall of 𝑦𝑀 reduces the change in ?̅?𝐿
ℎ, possibly even making it negative.       
Given the theoretical ambiguity of the behavior of 𝐺𝐿
𝜆, 𝐺𝑀
𝜆  and 𝐺𝐻
𝜆 it is helpful to consider a real-world 
example.  Autor and Dorn (2013) set out the changes in employment shares and wage rates for six broad 





Advantage 𝑨𝒊, Deprivation 𝑫𝒊, and Personal Gini Coefficients 𝑮𝒊 with λ = 1/2,  










𝑨𝒊 𝑫𝒊 𝑮𝒊 
1980 
1 0.316 17.0 3.415 0 0.126 
2  0.048 15.6 2.524 0.412 0.108 
3  0.216 13.6 1.224 1.156 0.088 
4 0.099 11.9 0.528 2.117 0.098 
5 0.222 11.3 0.305 2.589 0.107 
6 0.099 8.2 0 5.364 0.198 
2005 
1 0.409 23.1 6.108 0 0.180 
2 0.030 15.2 1.425 3.241 0.137 
3 0.182 13.9 0.692 3.814 0.133 
4 0.046 12.7 0.399 4.716 0.150 
5 0.204 13.5 0.537 4.069 0.135 
6 0.129 9.6 0 7.413 0.218 
 
Notes: (i) The mean wage is the geometric mean hourly wage derived from the mean log hourly 
wage reported by Autor and Dorn (2013), (ii) 𝐺𝑖 is the personal inequality index 𝐺𝑖
𝜆 when λ = 1/2, 
(iii) the occupational groups are: 
1. managers, professionals, technicians, finance and public safety occupations.   
2. production and craft occupations 
3. transportation, construction, mechanics, mining and farm occupations 
4. machine operators and assemblers 
5. clerical and retail sales occupations 
6. service occupations.     
 Source: Employment share and mean wage are from Autor and Dorn (2013, Table 1) - - see Note 





professionals, technicians, finance and public safety occupations experienced a 29% increase in 
employment share and a 36% rise in wage rates over those years.  The middle four groups together had a 
22% drop in employment share and only a 9% increase in wages.  The bottom group, consisting of service 
occupations, had a 30% rise in employment share and a 17% increase in wages.  These changes provide a 
dramatic example of labor market polarization.  
For the sake of this example, assume that everyone within each of the six Autor and Dorn occupational 
groups has the same income.  Using that assumption Table 1 shows 𝐺𝑖 rising for all six groups, as does 
deprivation 𝐷𝑖 (except for the top group, where it is identically zero.)  On the other hand, advantage, 𝐴𝑖, 
falls for groups 2, 3 and 4, because their wages decline relative to the wage of the bottom group.14  These 
results are obtained with 𝜆 = 1/2 .  If 𝐴𝑖 is weighted sufficiently more heavily, 𝐺𝑖
𝜆 declines from 1980 
to 2005 for each of groups 2, 3 and 4.  The critical values of 𝜆 are 0.61, 0.73 and 0.89 for groups 2, 3 and 
4 respectively.  Thus, if these groups were sufficiently more concerned about advantage than deprivation 
they would regard polarization as having reduced inequality between 1980 and 2005.  While worth 
noting, this result may not affect one’s conclusions much in view of the dominant opinion in the literature 
that λ ≤ ½ likely holds for most people. 
VII. Discussion and Conclusion 
The fact that the Gini coefficient can be interpreted as the average of personal Gini indexes produces 
interesting insights.  One important feature is that personal Gini coefficients are completely insensitive to 
transfers of income that occur only among people who have incomes above those of the reference 
individual, or among those with incomes below.  This means that they do not obey the Pigou-Dalton 
principle of transfers.  But they do regard transfers from those in the group above the individual to those 
 
14 Note that in 2005 group 4 has a lower mean wage than group 5.  This is accounted for in the numbers shown in 





in the group below as equalizing and transfers in the other direction as disequalizing.  These properties  
explain why the Gini coefficient’s sensitivity to transfers depends critically on the number of people with 
incomes between those of the donor and recipient, which makes it most sensitive to changes in the middle 
of typical income distributions.  This dependence reflects the fact that, aside from the donor and recipient 
themselves, it is only people between them whose personal Gini coefficients are affected by the transfer.   
As we have seen, each personal Gini coefficient is a weighted average of an individual’s deprivation and 
advantage. That the relative weights placed on these components can vary has a range of implications.  
For example, the weights could vary across societies, perhaps reflecting differences in individual 
attitudes.   At one extreme all the weight could be placed on deprivation in a society where people 
resented others being better off than themselves but had no concern about the income of those below 
them.  At the other extreme all the weight could be put on advantage if everyone had been taught to have 
concern for the “less fortunate” and not to envy the better-off.  And, of course, any weighting between 
these extremes could occur.  But in each society, taking the average of personal Gini coefficient values 
would still yield the conventional Gini coefficient, since it is unaffected by the relative weight placed on 
deprivation vs. advantage.  So, societies with quite different views about inequality at the individual level, 
could still all embrace the Gini coefficient as their aggregate measure of inequality.  It is tempting to 
imagine that this might help to explain the wide international popularity of this index. 
We have also discussed how personal inequality assessments may behave during secular change in 
income distribution.  In the development context, in the simplest model of the Kuznets transformation, 
personal inequality for those in the traditional sector rises throughout, while the opposite occurs in the 
modern sector.  If personal inequality reflects individual attitudes, the resulting scope for 
misunderstanding and conflict seems large.  This may throw some light on the tensions that are observed 
during periods of rapid modernization.  A further insight comes from the fact that the Gini coefficient 
says the Kuznets process stops being disequalizing well before half the population is in the modern sector.  




Under polarization, population shifts not only to the top but also to the bottom, with a shrinking middle 
group.  Income tends to rise at the top, fall in the middle, and may rise little at the bottom.  In a leading 
case, population shifts increase personal inequality at the bottom and reduce it at the top, echoing the 
Kuznets transformation results.  Personal inequality rises in the middle if there are no income changes.  
When income changes are also taken into account it is theoretically possible for any of the population 
shift effects to be reversed.  Given this ambiguity we turned to the real world for some guidance.  In an 
example based on the polarization seen in the US between 1980 and 2005, personal inequality rose for all 
groups when advantage and deprivation were equally weighted.  For three middle groups personal 
inequality would have fallen if sufficiently more weight were placed on their advantage rather than their 
deprivation.  However, if personal inequality reflects individual attitudes, it seems unlikely that the 
middle groups would indeed have regarded inequality as falling, given the broad consensus in the 
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This appendix provides proofs of propositions 4 and 5.  
Proposition 4:    If  𝑦1 < 𝑦2 < ⋯ < 𝑦𝑛 ,                         













 1 − 𝜆 . 






𝜆 as:  
(A1)          𝜆 ∑(𝑦𝑖+1 − 𝑦𝑗) +
𝑖
𝑗=1






  𝜆 ∑(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑗)
𝑖−1
𝑗=1




Now, the left-hand side of this expression can be written: 
(A2)          𝜆[∑ (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑗)
𝑖−1
𝑗=1 + 𝑖(𝑦𝑖+1 − 𝑦𝑖)] + (1 − 𝜆)[∑ (𝑦𝑗 − 𝑦𝑖) + (𝑛 − 𝑖)(
𝑛
𝑗=𝑖+1 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖+1)] 
Hence, (A1) simplifies to: 





which is equivalent to: 











from which one readily derives the result that 























Proposition 5:  If 𝑦1 < 𝑦2 < ⋯ < 𝑦𝑛, 
 
(i)  𝐺1











𝑙 ]; if n is even, 𝐺𝑚𝑒𝑑






Proof:  (i)  From (5) and (22), given that 𝑛1
𝑙 = 0, 
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(ii)  From (5) and (22), if n is odd we have: 

























If n is even there is no individual with median income since 𝑦1 < 𝑦2 < ⋯ < 𝑦𝑛 . 
(iii) From (5) and (22), given that 𝑛𝑛
ℎ = 0, 
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− 1] 
 
 
 
 
